RECENT CASES.
BANKRUPTCY-NEw PROMISE-MADE BETwEEN ADJUDICATION AND DisCHARGE-The promise of a bankrupt to pay a provable debt is enforceable
after discharge, although the promise was given before discharge but
after adjudication. Old Town Bank v. Parker, 87 At. Rep. iioS (Md. 19x3).
It is clear that such a promise given after discharge will give rise to
a cause of action.
lutual Life Ass'n v. Beatty, 93 Fed. 747 (1899). The
cause of action may be the new promise, which has for its consideration
the moral obligatioa to pay the debt which has been discharged but has
remained unpaid. Needham v. Matthewson, 81 Kan. 340 (igoi); Stewart
v. Reckless, 24 N. J. L, 427 (1854); Murphy v. Crawford, I14 Pa. 496
(1886). In Dusenbury v. Hoyt, 53 N. Y. 521 (1873), it was held that the
real cause of action is the new promise, but that, by a procedural anomaly,
the old promise is declared on. Another line of cases hold that the discharge does not extinguish the debt, but merely bars the remedy and
that a promise by a bankrupt, after discharge, amounts to a waiver of the
plea of discharge which he might offer in answer to action on the old
promise. This waiver needs no consideration. In these jurisdictions action
is on the old promise, the new one being reserved as a replication to the
plea of discharge. Way v. Sperry, 6 Cush. 238 (Mass. 185o); Champion v.
Buckingham, x65 Mass. 76 (1895); Fletcher v. Neally, 2o N. H. 464
(1846). But a promise to pay a debt which has been discharged by voluntary compensation is without consideration, moral or legal, and cannot
be enforced. Warren v. Whitney, 24 Mde. 6i (1845).
Jurisdictions which
hold that only the remedy is barred by discharge, hold that the debt itself
is extinguished by composition and that there can be no waiver, since there
is no cause of action. Porter v. Bell, 15 Lea 569 (Tenn. 1885); Taylor v.
Skiles, 81 S. W. Rep. 1258 (Tenn. i9o4); contra, Willing v. Peters, 12
S. & R. z77 (Pa. 1824). "
Since the discharge refers only to liabilities of the bankrupt incurred
before the filing of his petitiost, and since the bankrupt is not discharged
from any incurred after adjudication, a promise to pay given after adjudication is as forceful as if given after the actual discharge. Otis v. Gazlin,
31 Me. 567 (1850); Kirkpatrick v. Tattersall, 13 M. & W. 766 (Eng. 1845);
Zavelo v. Reeves. 227 U. S. 625 (1912).
A promise maded before filing
petition but received after adjudication has been held to have revived the
debt. Cheney v. Barge, 26 II. App. 182 (1887).
A contingent promise
(contingency unfulfilled at time of bankruptcy) given before adjudication to
a creditor who has refrained from pressing his claim in the bankruptcy
proceedings; has also been held to be enforceable. Kingston v. Wharton,
2 S. & R. 08 (Pa. i8x6).
BILu.s MD NoTrs-INTOxIcATED MAKsz-The holder of a note in due
course can not recover against the maker, from whom it was obtained by
fraud, while he was so intoxicated as to destroy the rational faculties of
the mind. Green v. Gunsten, 142 N. W. Rep. 261 (Wis. 1913).
The court bases the decision on the principle announced in Burnsinger
v. Bank of- Watertown, 67 Wis. 75 (1886), that an obligation is void when
entered into by a person while so intoxicated that he does not know the
nature of the obligation. The plaintiff cannot be assisted because of his
position as a holder in due course, for it is provided in the Negotiable Instruments Law that a holder of a note in due course takes no title where the
note was void in its inception. Brannan's N. 1, , §55 (1911).
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This case disregards what has always been the law, ri-., that intoxication of the maker of a note was no defence against a holder in due course
on the ground of public policy and necessity of commerce. State Bank v.
McCoy, 69 Pa. 24 (1871); McSparran v. Neeley, 9z Pa. 17 (1879); Smith
v. Williamson, 8 Utah, 219 (IL92).
For a thorough discussion, see the article by Mr. Sidney J. Dudley on
"Intoxication as a Defence to an Express Contract" in 62 U. of P. L
Rev. 34.
COLLC.cGs-GREEK LE R SOCiETnEs-REFuSAL oF ADMISSiON-Under an
act of the Legislature abolishing all Greek letter fraternities and secret
orders among the students of educational institutions supported by state
aid, the trustees and faculties of such institutions were required to enforce
these provisions by such rules and punishments as they should prescribe.
A member of a fraternity chapter at another college applied for admission
to the University of Mississippi and was refused, because he would not
sign a pledge to give tip all affiliations with his society while a student there.
Bill was filed for injunction against trustees. Held: The Legislature is in
control of colleges and universities of the state and has the right to legislate for their welfare. When it has done this, it is not subject to any
control by the courts. Univ. of Miss. v. Waugh, 62 So. Rep. 824 (Miss. x913).
Where no special act of the Legislature has been passed, the educational authorities in state institutions have the power to adopt appropriate
rules but such rules must be reasonable and their enforcement also must
be reasonable. Fertich v. Michener, ii Ind. 472 (1877). Such authorities
have no power to legislate concerning the acts of school children while at
home; a rule preventing them from attending social parties invades the
rights of the parents and exceeds the authority of the school board. Drift v.
Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 (1877). It has been held that connection with fraternities may be forbidden after the matriculation of a student, but that no such
conditions can be attached to his admission. State v. White, 82 Ind. 278
(0882). In this case it was said that it was clearly within the power of the
trustees and faculty to absolutely prohibit any connection between Greek
fraternities and the university. A dissenting opinion went further and
claimed that if there be expulsion for disobedience, there should also
be exclusion for refusing to promise compliance with proper regulations.
A student must be given an opportunity to be heard in his defence and
all evidence must be carefully considered before his dismission is justified.
Goldstein v. New York Univ., 77 N. Y. S. go (igo2). But where such an
opportunity has been offered and a careful examination made, any student
may be removed when it would be injurious to the institution to allow him
longer to remain. Koblitz v. Western Resere Univ., 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep.
144 (igox). An action of mandamus may be maintained to reinstate a
pupil in school if the action of the officers, by which the party was refused
admission to or continuance in the schoo was an arbitrary or capricious
exercise of authority. Jackson v. State, 42 L R. A. 792 (Neb. i898).
CONTRACTS-ILLFGALITY-RECOVERY FoR WoRic DONE-A contract, made
in violation of a statute providing that no member of the Legislature shall
be interested in any contract with the state, is unenforceable. Where one
of the parties thereto has performed in whole or in part, he can not avoid
the unlawful agreement and recover reasonable compensation. Norbeck v.
State, Y42 N. W. Rep. 847 (S. D. '9T3).
The case follows the general rule regarding illegal contracts, when the
parties are in pari delicto. Scott v. Brown, 2 Q. B. 724 (Eng. 1892) ; Society
v. Wetherill, 127 Fed. 947 (9o4); Hope v. Park Asso., 58 N. J. L. 627
(r896); Pittsburgh v. Goshorn. 230 Pa. 212 (i91!). The law leaves the
parties to illegal agreements where it finds them and gives them no assistance in extricating themselves therefrom. Shaffer v. Pinchback. 133 Ill. 410
(i8go) ; Johnson v. Hulings, io3 Pa. 498 (1883). The effect of the doctrine
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is the same whether the inherent nature of the contract is illegal; Sullivan
v. Horgan, 20 At. Rep. 232 (R. I. i8go); or whether the illegality arises
from the character or relationship of the parties. Milford v. Milford
Waterworks, 124 Pa. 6o (1889). Where, by statute, it is unlawful to
work more than a certain number of hours a day, no recovery can be had
for work overtime. Short v. Bullim, 57 Pac. Rep. 720 (Utah, x899). Money
paid to an executor to induce him to resign can not be recovered. Ellicott v.
Chamberlin, 38 N. J. E. 6o4 (1884); nor for money furnished or services
rendered on Sunday. Kinney v. McDermot, 55 Ia. 674 (x88i).
The general rule does not apply where the parties are not in pari delicto.
In such cases, the innocent person alone has a remedy. Burrows v. Rhodes,
Q. B.816 (Eng. 1897) ; Pearl v. Walter, So Mich. 317 (i89o). Parties are
Q
not in pan delicto where the contract is induced by fraud; National Bank
& Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189 U. S. 423 (10o3) ; or by duress. Klein v. Pederson, 65 Neb. 452, 91 N. W. Rep. 281 (i9o2).
Where the contract is not expressly declared void by statute, and does
not involve moral turpitude, but is prohibited only, the rule in the principal
case has no application. Under such circumstances, though the parties are in
equal fault, if one of them has received something of value, relief will be
granted to the extent of restoring the property or its value. Manchester Ry.
Co. v. Ry. Co., 2o AtL Rep. 383 (i8go).
CoNRACTS-OFFIM AND AccExTANcE-A cotton broker received from a
manufacturer an order to buy cotton which read, "You can accept this as
an order subject to withdrawal before execution." At io.o5 A. M. the
broker purchased cotton to fill the order, and at 10.1S A. M. wired the
manufacturer of his acceptance. At 10.4o A. M. the broker received a telegram, dispatched at 9.55 A. M., withdrawing the offer. Held: A binding
contract was made, the offer being accepted before withdrawal. Weld & Co.
v. Victory Mfg. Co., 205 Fed. Rep. 770 (913).
The court considered the contract as made at io.i5 A. M., holding that'
an acceptance by wire takes effect when sent; a revocation of an offer
when received. Brauer v. Shaw, 168 Mass. 198 (1897); Burton v. United
States, 2o2 U. S. 344, pp. 384-S (i9o6).
Although the question was not considered by the court, it is submitted
that the acceptance in fact took place at 1o.o5 A. M., when the cotton was
purchased. This offer was one leading to the formation of a bilateral contract, which is usually to be accepted by a promise, as distinguished from
a unilateral contract, to be accepted by performance of the. requirements of
the offer. Langdell, Summary of Contracts, pp. 12-13. Since, however, an
offerer may dictate the manner of indicating acceptance, Scott v. Davis, 141
Mo. 213 (1897); Swing v.Walker, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 366 (igo5), it would
seem that an offer of a bilateral contract could be so made as to permit
acceptance by an act rather than a promise. As regards the necessity for
notice of acceptance, the rule most frequently applied to unilateral contracts
would undoubtedly be asserted, zia., that if the act of acceptance is of
such a kind that notice of it will not quickly come to the offerer, the offeree
is bound to give notice of acceptance within a reasonable time. Bishop v.
Eaton, 161 Mass. 496 (1894). The contract is not formed by the giving of
the notice but by doing the act which has been, under the circumstances,
impliedli selected by the offerer as the manner in which the offeree may
indicate his acceptance. The notice is. in this view, material only as the
performance of an implied requirement which prevents the offerer ending
the contractual obligation already imposed on him as by a condition subsequent. Bishop N. Eaton, supra. In the present case the known fact that the
offeree purchased cotton from third person practically only to make re-sales
to others on arrangements made with them is sufficient to justify a finding
that the offerer contemplated his proposal should be acceptable by a purchase
of cotton in pursuance to his order. "Before execution,' in the order, shows
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this to have been his intention. His attempted withdrawal also contained the
phrase, "if not bought." See opinion of Folger, J., in White v. Corlies, 26
N. Y. 467 (1871).
CORPORATION-CONSENT TO Ultra Vires AcTs-In an action on an accommodation note brought by a bank against a corporation. the defence was that
the endorsement was an ultra sires act. It was contended by the bank that
since all the stockholders had consented to the act, and were thus estopped
from pleading its illegality, the corporation which represents and acts for
the stockholders would be in no better position. Held: The consent of all
the stockholders will not estop the corporation from challenging the legality
of an act which is wholly beyond the scope of its charter powers. Savannah
Ice Company v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Company, 79 S. E. Rep. 45
(Ga. 1913).
This is in accord with the weight of authority in this country and is
put on the ground that the powers of a corporation depend, not upon the
consent of its stockholders, but upon the powers granted by the state. I
Clark & Marshall on Private Corporations, §§125, 171, 182; Thompson on
Corporations (2nd Ed.), §§-oo3, 2776; Thompson v. West, 59 Neb. 677,
49 L R. A. 3.37 (1oo) ; Park Hotel Company v. Fourth National Bank of
St. Louis, 86 Fed. 742 (1898). in which it was said that a contract which a
corporation has no power to make, it has no power to ratify, and no power
to estop itself from denying.
A contrary view seems to prevail in a very few jurisdictions. Martin v.
Niagara Falls Manufacturing Company, r22 N. Y. 165 (j899); Murphy v.
Arkansas Land Company, 97 Fed. 723 (i899); Perkins v. Trinity Realty
Company, 69 N. J. Eq. 723 (19o5); I Cook on Corporations (7th Ed.).
§§3, 774, in which the rule is stated that a private corporation is bound
if all of its stockholders assent and none of its creditors are injured.
However, an examination of the authorities cited shows that the rule is
based mostly on dicta and is unsound, for it is a well established principle
that stockholders in a corporation cannot by consent set aside and render
void a limitation placed by law upon the corporate action.
The doctrine in the principle case may not be invoked to defeat the
ends of justice or work a legal wrong, as where the corporation has acquired
and retains the fruits of the ultra zires contract or act. Pittsburgh, etc.,
Railroad Company v. Altoona & Beech Creek Railroad Company, x96 Pa.
452 (i9oo); Kellogg-Mackay Company v. Havre Hotel Company et al., z99
Fed. 727 (1)912); Thompson on Corporations (2nd Ed.), §§2oo3, 2778. At
one time it was held by a few jurisdictions that even though the corporation
had received or enjoyed the consideration or the benefits of the act, this
fact did not estop it from defending on the ground of ultra 24re$. Albert
v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, I Md. Chan. 407 (1849).

CORPORATION-PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS FROM CAPITAL-Upon the purchase
of two thousand shares of its capital stock, the vendor gave its bond to
vendee, guaranteeing that the dividends upon such stock would amount to
$iooo within a specified time. There having been no dividends within the
specified time, vendee brought suit upon the bond. Held: That vendee could
Jorguson v. Apex Gold Mines Co., 133 Pac. Rep. 465
recover.
not
(Wash.
1913).
The decision proceeded upon the statute in the jurisdiction making it
unlawful to declare dividends except from net profits; and the bond could
not be enforced, since it required dividends to be paid out of the capital.
There are varying statutory or constitutional provisions in a number of
states expressly restricting the right to pay dividends except out of net
profits properly applicable thereto, and which shall not in any way impair
or diminish the capital. But the principle upon which these statutes are
based, and the prohibitions which they express, are fully recognized by the
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common law. It is a fundamental rule of the common law, that dividends
can be paid only out of surplus earnings, and cannot properly be declared
out of capital. Its re National Funds Co., L. R. io Ch. Div. iz8 (Eng. 1878);
'Mobile R. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486 (1893); Martin v. Zellerbach.
38 Cal. 3oo (1869); Hubbard v. Weare, 79 Iowa. 678 (i8go); Grant v.
Southern Contract Co., io4 Ky. 781 (1898); Field v. Lamson & Goodnow Co,
162 Mass. 388 (1894); Morawetz on Corporations (2nd Ed.), §435; Thompson on Corporations (2nd Ed.), §53o5; Cook on Corporations (6th Ed.),
§546. Since the stockholders, in the absence of statute, are not individually
liable for the debts of the corporation, the creditors deal with the corporation oni the faith of its capital stock as the only means of repayment, and
therefore it would be a fraud upon the creditors to divert the capital stock
by distribution among the stockholders as a dividend. Moreover, each stockholder is entitled to have the capital preserved unimpaired for the purpose
of carrying on the business for which the company was formed. Reed v.
Mfg. Co., 4o Ga. 98 (i869).
This principle, however, does not extend so far as to maintain the
capital at its original value, where, from its very nature, it is subject to a
steady waste and depreciation. For example, in the case of a mining corporation, the profits subject to distribution are the net proceeds of its mining
operations, without any deduction for decrease in value of the mine by
reason of the ore being taken out. This principle applies to all corporations
organized for the purpose of utilizing a wasting property-a property that
can be used only by consuming it-as a mine, a lease, or a patent; nor is
there any obligation imposed upon such a company to set apart a sinking
fund to meet the depreciation in the value of the property. Lee v. Neuchatel Co., 4! Ch. Div. I (Eng. 1887); Excelsior Mining Co. v. Pierce, 9o
Cal. 131 (189x).
As to the question of the guaranty, the courts, with practical unanimity,
in sustaining the objection against any dividends which cannot be paid out
of income, but which can be paid only by drawing upon the capital, have'
construed general language guaranteeing dividends upon stock to mean that
dividends should be paid out of profits if any were made, but not otherwise. Bingham v. Marion Trust Co.. 27 Ind. App. 247 (igoi); Lockhart
v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich. 76 (1875) ; Ohio School v. Rosenthal. 45 Ohio St.
x83 (1887); Pittsburgh & C. R. R. Co. v. County of Allegheny, 63 Pa.
26 (i869).
Where such construction is not possible, such guarantee is held
to be in contravention of public policy and void; Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31
Mich. 76 (1875); and, in Memphis Co. v. Memphis & C. R. R. Co., 85 Tenn.
703 (1887), such agreement was held to be an ultra tire$ act, and therefore
unenforceable.
Couxrs-AssocIAlz JuDGEs UNLEARNED IN THE LAw-On undisputed facts
the learned president judge dismissed a petition for a mandamus, but his
two associates, unlearned in the law, filed what they called a dissenting
opinion and directed a writ of peremptory mandamus to issue. Held:
Appeal granted. It was never contemplated that such judges should set up
their judgment against that of the head of the court on a matter of law.
Com. ex rel. v. Lenhart, Appellant, 24t Pa. 129 (1913).
The powers and duties of associate judges of the same court depend
upon the constitution and statutes of the state where they act. Pennsylvanzr seems to be the only jurisdiction having associate judges unlearned
in the law. They are provided for by the Act of 18.34, P. L. 333, ig and
W. By §2o of the same act it is provided that "the two associate judges shall
have power to hold common pleas court, to bear and determine all causes.
matters and things cognizable therein according to the Constitution, laws
and usages of the Commonwealth." The act also extends their power to
the Orphans' Court but by §58 the presence of the president judge, learned
in the law, is necessary to hold a court of oyer and terminer. By the 5th
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article of the Constitution of 1874, §5, "the office of associate judge not
learned in the law is abolished in counties forming separate districts."
Although elected by the people of the counties in which they sit, such
judges are officers of the stat and unimpeachable save by the state, Leib
v. Com., 9 Watts, 20o (184o), Com. v. Dumbauld, 97 Pa. 293 (x88i), Campbell v. Com., 96-Pa. 344 (I88i). Two such judges cannot override the decision of the president judge in matters of law. Syracuse etc. Oil Co. v.
Carothers, 63 Pa. 379 (j869); Glamorgan Iron Co. v. Snyder, 84 Pa. W
(1877). But they can announce a decision made on an argument before a
full court. Reiber v. Boos, :xo Pa. 594, I At. Rep. 422 (1885). Or hear and
determine a motion when so directed by the president judge. Van Vliet v.
Conrad, 95 Pa. 404 (i88o). Two associates may, however, overrule the law
judge upon a writ of habeas corpus. Com. v. Kyder, i Penny. 143 (igsi).
Or in the granting or refusal to grant a liquor license. Leister's Appeal, 2o
W. N. C. 224, ii At. Rep. 387 (1887); Branches' License, 164 Pa. 427,
6o At. Rep. 296, 35 W. N. C. 310 (x894). In the absence of the president
judge the associates cannot refuse to assume any of the legal functions of a
court. Richardson v. Stewart's Lessee, 2 S. & R. 84 (z8i5).
CRIMIN'AL LAw-UREASONABLE SEARCHES-Officers, without a warrant,
entered the premises of the accused, forcibly took from his person his keys,
opened his safe therewith, and therein found whiskey which they subsequently offered as evidence in an action against him. Held: Evidence so
obtained is not admissible because it is in violation of the constitutional
provision that "no person shall be compelled to give testimony tending in
any manner to incriminate himself." Underwood v. State, 78 S. E. Rep. 1i3
(Ga. 1913).
As a general rule evidence unlawfully obtained is held admissible provided the accused is not compelled to do any act which incriminates
himself, and a confession or incriminating admission is not extorted from
him. Legatt v. Tollervey, 14 East 302 (Eng. 181); State v. Flynn, 36 N.
H. 64 (1858) : State v. Burroughs, 72 Me. 479 (i88i); om. v. Smith, s66
Mass. 370, 44 N. E. Rep. 5o3 (x896) ; Williams v. State, too Ga. 5t. 28 S. E.
Rep. 624 (1897) ; Martin v. State, I Ala. App. 2i5, 56 S. E. Rep. 3 (gri).
See also 4 Wigmore on Evidence, §2264.
The contrary view is that by a liberal interpretation of the constitutional provision mentioned, evidence which is secured by the unauthorized
search of the pers6n, or by invasion or trepass upon his premises, is inad.missible. The leading case cited for authority for this view is Boyd v.
U. S., i16 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (x886). There is some doubt whether this
case really decides the point in question and is not but dicta as to the principle advanced. The case has been followed, however, in the case of an
unauthorized search of premises. State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, So At. Rep,
1097 (igoi). And the principle has been supported in cases where there
has been an unauthorized search of the person as in the principal case.
Evans v. State, io6 Ga. 59, 32 S. I- Rep. 659 (899); Hammock v. State,
i Ga. App. I2 58 S. E. Rep. 66 (19o7).
The court in Hammock v. State, supra, attempts to distinguish the apparent conflict in the cases and to reconcile them in the following language:
"Under the Constitution persons are protected against unlawful searches
and seizures and also against being compelled to give testimony tending in
any manner to incriminate themselves. A violation of the former right
does not necessarily render evidence, incidentally disclosed thereby, inadmissible. A violation of the latter right does. When the act in question is
a concurrent violation of both rights, the person is none the less to bi
protected."

DiVORCE-CONTRACT FOR ALr.uoNy Pendente Lite-A contract, made after
divorce proceedings have commenced, stipulating the amount of alimony
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to be paid, will be enforced, provided that the divorce was justified and that
there was no collusion or suppression of facts from the court. Such an
agreement, when not made to facilitate divorce, hut devised solely as an
amicable settlement of property rights, is not against public policy. Maish
v. Maish, 87 AtI. Rep: 72-9 (Conn. 1913).
The majority of jurisdictions are in accord with this case. Burnett v.
Paine, 62 Me. 122 (z874); Pryor v. Pryor, 88 Ark. 302 (igo8); Palmer v.
Fagcrlin. 163 Mich. 345 (1910); Warren v. Warren. 116 finn. 458 (1912);
Contra, Moon v. Bann. 58 Ind.. 194 (1877); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 89 Ill.
349 (r878); Lake v. Lake. 136 App. Div. 47 (N. Y. igog), As a general
rule, however, a similar contract made before marriage is illegal, as an
agreement in derogation of marriage; Watson v. Watson, 77 N. E. Rep.
335 (Ind. i9o6); and does not limit the liability for or the amount of
alimony. Stearns v. Stearns. 66 Vt. 187 (1893). So a contract made after
marriage, vhile living in amity is void. Daggett v. Daggett, 5 Paige, 509
(N. Y. 1835). But where disagreements have occurred and a separation is
contemplated or has taken place, a contract to support during lifetime is
valid. Gaines v. Poor, 6o Ky. 210 (z86i); and if a divorce is subsequently
decreed, no additional alimony will be granted. Galusha v. Galusha, ii6
N. Y. 635 (x889) ; though there has been a change in the husband's financial condition. Henderson v. Henderson, 37 Ore. 141 (i9oo).
A contract, made pending petition for divorce, to pay stipulated sum in
lieu of alimony, is looked upon with suspicion, as tending to facilitate
divorce. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 4 Day 343 (Conn. i81o). But if the agreement be made without fraud or collusion and amply protects the interests of
the wife and fairly disposes of the property rights of the parties, it will be
sustained. Parsons v. Parsons, 62 S. W. Rep. 719 (Ky. i9oi). But a contract
to pay certain sum whether or not alimony is granted is illegal. Speck v.
Dausman, 7 Mo. App. 165 (879).
EQUITY PRACTICE-SET-OFF AND COUNTFRCLAI.St In ANswFR-In a suit
in equity for infringement of a patent, the answer sought to interpose, under
the second paragraph of rule 30 of the new equity rules (198 Fed. XXVII,
115 C. C. A. XXVII. effective February 1st, 1913), a counterclaim arising
out of the infringement of another patent, which was the subject of an
independent suit in equity between the same parties in the same court.
Held: The counterclaim was rightly pleaded in the answer. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America v. National Electric Signaling Company et ol., 2o6 Fed. 295 (t913).
This is the liberal interpretation of a rule which says: "The answer inust
state in short and simple form any counter-claim arising out of the transaction
which is the subject matter of the suit, and may, without cross-bill, set out
any set-off or counter-claim against the plaintiff which might be the subject
of an .independent suit in equity against him, and such set-off or counterclaim, so set up, shall have the same effect as a cross-suit, so as to enable the
court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit on the original and crossclaims." In arriving at above conclusion the court drew a sharp distinction
between the mandatory and permissive portions of the rule, saying that when
the claim arises out of the same transaction it must be included in the answr,
so the matter shall be rendered res adjudicata and future litigation avoided;
but when it arises out of another transaction and is the subject of an independent suit in equity it may be included in the answer, at the discretion of
the court, but if omitted the doctrine of res adjudicata would not be invoked
against the defendant. In the latter case it is in the nature of a cross-suit, and
does more than take the place of a cross-bill, which is merely auxiliary to and
a part of the original suit, the subject matter being essentially connected with
that of the original hill. Lovell v. Latham & Company, i86 Fed. 602 (igr).
The new rule 3o. by saying that any claim which might be the subject of an
independent equity suit may be set out in the answer with the same effect as
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a "cross-suit," seems to warrant the broad meaning given to "counter-claim,"
for if restricted to claims arising out of the same transaction it would only
have the same effect as a "cross-bill," which is impliedly abolished by this rule,
and the greater part of the paragraph would be purposeless.
The interpretation of the rule is in accord with the present English practice. Beddall v. Maitland, 17 Ch. Div. 174, 181 (1879). But a different view
was taken in Terry Steam Turbine Company v. B. F. Sturtevait Company,
204 Fed. i03 (1913), where it was said that "To make 'counterclaim' include
all cross claims upon which the defendant might sue the plaintiff in equity,
even if having no connection, however remote, with the plaintiff's cause of
action, is to permit two original bills in tile same suit. which is certainly in
violation of well-settled principles." Accord, Williams Patent Crusher &
Pulverizer Company v. Kinsey Manufacturing Company, 205 Fed. 375 (1913).
In these two cases, the court seems to hold that the permissive way of
pleading is no broader than the mandatory.
FALSE I.PRI'RSONMENT-ERoR IN PROC'RFM
tET-rhe defendant truthfully
stated facts amounting to a trespass by the plaintiff to a jusfice, and asked
for the plaintiff's ejection but not for his arrest. Under the instruction of the
justice he swore that the plaintiff came under the Disorderly Persons Act,
and in so doing, swore to an erroneous conclusion of law. Theensuing arrest
was held not to have been of the defendant's procurement, and he was therefore not liable for false imprisonment. Kendel v. Guterl, 87 AtI. Rep., 84
(N. J.. 1913).
This rule prevails in most jurisdictions, and has long been recognized in
New Jersey. Booth v. Kurrus, 55 N. J. L 370 (893) puts it on the-ground
that comnlplainant has a right to submit a true statement of facts to the judgment of a magistrate, no matter what his notion was as to their legal value.
Cf. also Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N. J. L 6.4 (1882). Tile following cases indorse the general proposition that the defendant is not liable for false imprisonmelt, if lie did not participate in the plaintiff's arrest beyond making
tle complaint which was insufficient and rendered the ensuing warrant void
on its face. Smith v. Clark, io6 Pac. Rep. 653 (Utah, igo) ; Bert v. Schwartz,
i37 N. Y. App. 23o (9i o); McIntosh v. Bullard, 12-9 S. W. Rep. 85 (Ark.,
i9o) ; Cooper v. Harding, 7 Q. B. 28 (Eng., 1845) ; Sloan v. Schomaker, 136
Pa. 382 (89x); Murphy v. W\'alters, 34 Mich. 18o (1876). Similarly a complaint based upon an ordinance subsequently declared invalid does not-make
the complainant liable. Gifford v. Wiggins, so Minn. 401 (1892).
The rule in New York was at first contra. Gcld v. Bissell, I Wend. 210
(N. Y., 18&8) ; but it is now in accord with the prevailing opinion. Brown v.
Chadsey, 39 Barb. 253 (N. Y., 1863); and Swart v. Rickart, 148 N. Y. 264
(1896) made the jurisdiction of the magistrate, and the consequent lack of
liability on the complainant's part dependent upon the magistrate's own discretion. Cf. Novak v. Waller, io N. Y. Supp. i99 (i8go).
The minority view is summarized in Fkumoto v. Marsh, 130 Cal. 66
(x9oo). "The court's jurisdiction to issue a warrant depends on the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit for the arrest and not on the judge's opinion as to
its legal sufficiency. The plaintiff must see to it that lie is clothed with actual,
not merely apparent, authority before he can deprive the defendant of his
liberty."
J.LRY-RHiT TO TRIAL 1V Jt-tY-JuxiMENT N. 0. V.-A Massachusetts
statute (1909, C. 236), provides that in civil cases when the lower court denies
a request by either party, that judgment should be directed for that party and
the jury returns a verdict for the other party, the Supreme Judicial Court, if
from the evidelce it appears that the request should have been granted, may
direct a verdict for the party in whose behalf the request was made and
erroneously refused. In a negligence case the Street Railway Company re-
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quested that a judgment be directed for them; request was refused and the
company appealed, invoking the above statute. The plaintiff claimed that he
was denied his right to trial by jury as provided in the Seventh Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. Held: This statuate does not take away the constitutional right to trial by jury. Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., io N.
E. Rep. 665 (Mass.,19i3).
This branch of the law has recently been subjected to a great amount of
discussion caused by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Slocum v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364 (19x3); 6i U. P. L. R. 673.
In this case, a Pennsylvania statute, Pa. L. igo5, p. 286, c. 198, similar to the
Massachusetts statute was held by a decision of five to four to deny the right
to trial by jury and to be, therefore, unconstitutional. The decision is based on
the principle that it is an unconstitutional exercise of the power of legislation
for the court to authorize the entry of judgment, in cases where jury trial has
been had, in any way except in conformity with the verdict, the only method,
therefore, of correcting an error resulting from an erroneous refusal to direct
a verdict is to order a new trial. The dissenting opinion holds that the statute
provides merely a simplification of the common law practice of demurring to
evidence. The statute is not unconstitutional as the appellate court merely reconsiders the question of law as to whether there is enough evidence to go to
the jury and does not concern itself with any questions of fact.
It is submitted that the principal case and the dissenting opinion of the
Slocum case show the better view of the law. The statute does not infringe
upon the functions of the jury; it merely gives the appellate court the power
which the lower court always had--of directing a verdict provided the law
required it; and is of help to lessen the delays of litigation.
SiBEL AND SL.ANEaR-PRMvntz-- lisTrAxrc.A statement was published in
a newspaper that the plaintiff had been indicted by a grand jury. The libellous
publication, though intended to refer to him, was due to a mistake in identity,
a man with a similar name having been indicted. Held: Evidence of reasonable care inadmissible. The plaintiff was entitled to an action, since the Occasion was not privileged so far as he was concerned. Sweet v. Post Publishing
Co., xo2 N. E. Rep. 66o (Mass., 1913).
It is well settled that the proprietor of a newspaper possesses no special
immunity from liability for publishing libels. Smith v. Tribune, 4 Bissell 447
(U. S. 1867); Ryalls v. Leader, L R. z Ex. 296 (866); Morse v. Times-Republican, 124 Iowa 7o7 (19o4).

Where the o&aiion is not privileged, it is

no defence that there was a bona fide belief, founded upon reasonable grounds,
that the statements were true. Anderson v. Fairfax, 4 N. S. Wales L R. 183
(1883) ; Ingram v. Reed, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 55o (897). Unprivileged news is
printed at the peril of the publisher. Burt v. Advertiser, x54 Mass. 238

(1891).

As a general rule, fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings are
qualifiedly privileged. Kimber v. Press.Ass., 1 0. B. 65 (Eng. x8.93); MeBee v.
Fulton, 47 Md. 403 (1877); Willman v. Press Publishing Co., 49 N. Y. App.
Div. 35 (xgoo); unless publication is prohibited by the court, or the subject
matter is obscene or blasphemous. Amer. Pub. Co. v. Gamble, xi5 Tenn. 663
(1905).

The principal case must be distinguished from cases where the publication
was caused by a mistake of identity, but was intended to refer to another
person, of the same name and description, as to whom the facts stated of the
plaintiff were true or justifiable on the ground of privilege. Some jurisdictions
hold that since it can not be proved that the words were written "of and con-

cerning the plaintiff," he can not recover. Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co.,
159 Mass. 293 (1893); Hutchinson v. Robinson, 21 N. S. Wales L. R. 13o
(19oo).

However, the weight of authority holds that since the publication b.y

mistake is not true, or the occasion privileged, as to the person libelled, he is
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entitled to recover. Griebel v. Rochester, 6o Hun 319 (N. Y. i8go). Fox v.
Broderick, 14 Ir. C. L 453 (1864) ; Pullman v. Hill. x Q. B. 524 (Eng. i8gi).
So where the name of the plain-tiff was inserted under the heading "Bankruptcies" instead of "Dissolutions of Partnerships," recovery'was allowed. Shepheard v. Whitaker, L R. 1o C. P. 5o2 (nig. 1875). Similarly, where the
mistake was due to an error in setting type. Taylor v. Hearst, ioy Cal, 26a

(x8g5).

NEcGLGENCE-RALROAD ToitpEto-PRoxiuATE CAUsE-The brother of the

deceased picked up a signal torpedo from the track of the defendant, and being
unaware of its daiigerous character, struck it with an iron. The torpedo
exploded killing the deceased, an eight year old boy. Held: The negligence
of the defendant's servants in carelessly and wantonly permitting such dangerous and highly explosive torpedoes to fall on the roadbed, was the proximate
cause of the boy's death. Mills v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 78 S. E. Rep. 8x6
(Ga. 1913).
Though these "torpedo" cases do not turn on the question as to what
intervening circumstance or fact would break the chain of causation or free
the negligent person from the result of his negligence, the decisions in some
have depended upon this character of evidence. Harriman v. Pittsburgh, etc.,
Ry. Co.- 45 Ohio St. It (1887). This point is fully discussed in Carpenter v.
M iller & Son. 232 Pa. 362 (191x), where the court ruled that the intervention
of the plaintiff rather than the negligence of the defendant was the proximate
cause, and that the defendant could not have forseen the injury. Shields v.
Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 24 N. E. Rep. 658 (Ohio i8go) which arose out of the
same accident as Harriman v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., supra, was decided upon
the law of master and servant and the question of proximate cause was
ignored.
Several cases which at first glance appear to be contra to the principal
case, are not so in fact. There was a nonsuit in Hughes v. Boston & Maine
R. R. Co., 71 N. H. 279 (1902) because no evidence was introduced from
which negligence could possibly be inferred. The same general result was
reached in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hart, 7o S. W. Rep. 83o (Ky. x9o2).
Though the company knew that boys were accustomed to play where the torpedo was set, it was relieved from liability by the failure to show any negligence in the method of using torpedoes and of their care after the necessity
of use had ceased. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Williams. 98 Ark. 72 (1911).
An illustration was cited in Carter v. Columbia R. R. Co., 19 S. C. 20 (i882)
from which it can be inferred that if the torpedo had been left on the track
for an improper purpose, the decision would have been against the company,
even though the deceased was an adult.
NEw TVIAL-IPEACHMENT OF VE~mo"cr By JURMo-MiScoNDUCT O7 JuR-

The testimony of a juror will not be received to impeach a verdict respecting a
matter inherent in the verdict itself. McDonald v. Pless, 2o6 Fed. Rep. z63
(1913). Upon reasons of public policy, courts have almost uniersally refused
to allow jurors to impeach their own verdicts. White v. White, 5 Rawle 61
(Pa. 1835); Clum v. Smith. 5 Hill, 56o (N. Y. 1843); Haight v. Turner, 21
Conn. 593 (1852;) Shepherd v. Inhab. Camden, 82 Me. 535 (x89o).
In many states, however, it has been provided by statute that verdicts may
be impeached by jurors. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §657; Gantts Dig. z97x (Ark.);
Texas Code Crim. Pro. Art. ,-7. In the decisions based on these statutes it
has generally been held that the affidavit of the juror must be voluntary.
Hunter v. State, 8 Tex. App. 75 (i88o). Such statutes are strictly construed
and under them a verdict may not be impea,-hed because of a misunderstanding
of instructions or undue influence of other jurors. Wright v. Illinois Tel. Co.,
20 Iowa 193 (86.).
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PLEADING--STATUTE OF FRAUDs-The defense of non-compliance with the
Statute of Frauds, if relied upon, must be specially pleaded. Lurie v. Pinanski, io2 N. E. Rep. 629 (Mass. 1913).
In England prior to the Judicature Acts, although the plaintiff need not
allege a compliance with the Statute, yet the defendant is allowed to show a
non-compliance with 'the Statute under the general issue. Eastwood v.
Kenyon, ixi A. & E. 438 (Eng. 184o); Buttemere v. Hayes, 5 M. & W. 456
(Eng. 1839). The same rule has been to a large extent followed in the United
States. Dunphy v. Ryan, ix6 U. S. 491 (j885); Lozier v. Hill, 68 N. J. Eq. 300
(1904) ; Thielans v. White, ix W. N. C. (Pa. i88z). In many jurisdictions, on
the other hand, it has been held, in accord with the principal'case, that a contract not made in compliance with the Statute of Frauds is a voidable and not
a void contract, and can therefore only be avoided by a special plea of the
Statute. James v. Smith, x Ch. 384 (Eng. i8gi); Williams v. Davis, 46 IlL
App. 228 (1892) ; Livingston v. Murphy, 187 Mass. 3I (i9oS).
In a few jurisdictions it is held that compliance with the Statute must be
alleged by the plaintiff. Duncan v. Clements, 17 Ark. 27 (1856); Wiseman v.
Thompson, 94 Iowa 6o7 (z895); Morgan v. Wickliffe, 11o Ky. 215 (1sox).
PR0CEDURE-ATTAcIzXENT OF STOCK 1- FOREIGN CORPORATIO-Stock in a

foreign corporation cannot be attached in an action against a non-resident,
not within the state. United States Express
when the shares themselves are
Co. v. Hurlock, 87 Ati. Rep. 8 34 (Md. 1913).
It is universally held that the situs of the stock of a corporation is in the
state of incorporation. Smith v. Downey, 8Ind. App. 179 (1893); Ireland v.
Globe Milling Co., ig R. I. tSo (1895). In some jurisdictions, at the home of
the owner. Ashley v. Quintard, 9o Fed. 84 (j898); Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N.
Y. 592 (1883): or, where the certificates may be found. Simpson v. Jersey
City Contracting Co., i65 N. Y. 193 (xgoo); Puget Sound Bank v. Mather,
6o Minn. 362 ('i85). But this last proposition is not followed in jurisdictions
where the certificates are considered as mere indicia of ownership and not
as the property itself. Christmas v. Biddle, T3 Pa. 223 (i85o); Young v.
Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. x89 (i886); Armour Bros. v. St. Louis Bank, 113
Mo. 12 (1892). For the dictum to the effect that the stock could have been
attached if found in the state, the court in the principal case relied on the
distinguishable case of De Bearn v. Prince de Beam, 115 1d. 668 (igii) in
which the property attached was a registered bond in a foreign corporation.
The establishment of an office in the state, in which action is brought, by a
corporation incorporated in another state does not change the situs of the
stock for purposes of attachment, for the corporation as such continues in the
state in which it was chartered and from which its stock must issue. Plimpton
v. Bigelow, supra; New Jersey Sheep Co. v. Trader's Bank, io4 Ky. 9o (I898);
Stevens v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. 15o (869). Where the stock register
and minute books of the company have been kept outside of the state of incorporation it has been held that the corporation was domestic in both states
and that stock of a non-resident could be attached in either state. Telegraph
Co. v. Howell, 162 Mo. App. io8 (1911). So where the chief offices were in
another state than that of incorporation. Bowman v. Breyfogle, 145 Ky. 443
(1911). But these cases are not followed by the weight of authority which
holds that a corporation as such cannot leave the state of incorporation.
RAILROADS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIoNs-ADVERSE Possessio-The owner of
land abutting on a railroad's right of way claimed title to part of the right of
way by adverse possession for over twenty-one *years. Held: The right of
way of a railroad company, as soon as it is acquired, is impressed with a
public use and no right of occupancy in such right of way can be acquired by
adverse possession. Conwell v. Philadelphia and Reading Ry., 241 Pa. 172
(1913).

RECENT CASES
The Statute of Limitations does not apply to lands which have been dedicated to the public use. Thus holders by adverse possession have not been
allowed to set up their title when tie property in dispute was part of a court
house plot. Foley v.County (-our!, 54 W. Va. 16 (x9o3) ; or a room in a
court house. Bay St. Louis v. liancock Co.. 8o Miss. 364 (1902). For the
same reason streets and highways are not subject to adverse possession.
Brown v. Carthage. 128 Mo. 1o (1i,95) ; Shirk v. Chicago, 195 111. 2,98 (19o);
Bodine v. Trenton. 7 Vroom 198 (N. J. 1873). Likewise turnpikes as they are
puhlic highways. Stevenson's Appeal. 17 W. N. C. 429 (Pa. 1883). Railroads,
as they are public highways, come under the same rule. Railroad v. Borough,
138 Pa. 9i (18.9o) ;Reading Co. v. Seip, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 330 (19o6) ; Railway
Railway v. Ely, 197 U. S. 1 (1904);
v. Townsend, 10o U. S. 267 (9o-2);
Durham v. Railway, 121 Fed. 894 (N. C.

19o3).

The land belonging to a rail-

road which is not used for its tracks is however not considered dedicated to
public use and such land may be acquired by adverse possession. Railway v.
; Railway v. Tobyhanna Co.. 232 Pa. 76 (igt).
Frank. 39 Pa. Super. 624 (go9.)
W3'hen. however, the property is no longer used for public purposes, it
ceasL., to he exempt froum the Statute of Limitations and may he acquired by
adverse possession. Collet v. Vanderburgh Co., iI9 Ind. 27 (1889); Rector
v. Christy, 114 Ia. 471 (1901).
OF DAMsAc.Es-A manufacturing
SALFS-CNDITIONAL SALES-MIEASURE
company contracted to sell machines to a dealer under the arrangement that
the title was to remain in the company until full payment was made, with a
proviso that if payment was not nade before a certain date, the dealer would
give the company a promissory note for the purchase price. The machines
were delivered and as no payment was made, the dealer gave the company
his promissory note. As this note remained unpaid, the company brought
suit thereon. The dealer claimed that he was not liable for the full purchase
price, but the measure of damages should be the difference between the purchase price and the re-sale value. Held: As the dealer had accepted the
goods under the contract, the company had the right to recover the purchase.
price which was represented by the promissory note. International Harvester
Co. v. Pott, 142 X. W. Rep. 652 (S.D. 1913).
It is difficult to see how the idea of "measure of damages" was brought
into this case. It is the universal rule that the difference between the purchase
price and the market value as a measure of damages applies only where the
vendee in a conditional sale has refused to accept the goods. Fireworks Co. v.
Polites, 130 Pa. 536 (1889) ; Mitchell v. Baker, 2o8 Pa. 377 (19o4) ; Dustan v.
McAndrew, 44 N. Y. 72 (1870). Even the wording of the section of the code
is contrarv to the claim of the dealer as it limits the application of the rule to
the "detriment caused by the breach of a buyer's agreement to accept and pay
for personal property." S. D. Civil Code, §23o3. The dealer based his claim
on a previous South Dakota case where it was held that this measure of damages did apply even though there was delivery; but in that case the delivery
was to the dealer to sell and title was to pass on fulfilment of the condition to
the dealer's vendee and not to the dealer. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. White Rock
Lumber Co.. 26 S. D. 374 (igo). This case may be therefore distinguished
from the principal case.

SALES.--DELIVERY-A vendor surrendered bill of lading and authorized delivery of goods before payment. The vendee resold the goods and the vendor
brought replevin. claiming that title to them still remained in him. Held: The
conduct of parties did not show an intention that title should not pass without
payment. The sale will be considered to have been made on credit and the
defendant acquired good title, as did subsequent vendees. Kemper Grain Co.

v. Harbour et al., 133 Pac. Rep. 565 (Kan. 1913).
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Upon such contracts the seller is not bound to deliver before payment is
made; but if he does make an unqualified delivery, he waives his advantage and
the title pa:.ses. Goodwin v. Boston & L R. Co., tit Mass. 487 (1873). Where
the sale is held to be conditional upon payment, delivery of possession to the
vendee and subsequent resale by him will not bar the original owner from
asserting his title even as against a bona fide purchaser for value. Baals v.
Stewart, log Ind. 371 (1886) ; Fairbanks Co. v. Graves, 9o Miss. 453 (1907);
Riley v. Dillon, 148 Ala. 283 (i9o6). The majority of jurisdictions in the
United States support this view but some are contra. Dearborn v. Raysor,
132 Pa. 231 089o); Van Duzor v. Allen, 90 Ill. 499 (1878). As provided by
the Factors' Act of 18,9. the courts of England uph6ld title in a bona fide
purchaser from a conditional vendee. Lee v. Butler, 2 Q. B. 318 (1893).. In
all cases, laches on the part of the vendor will be held to constitute a waiver
if the property reaches the hands of innocent third persons. Leatherbury v.
Connor, 54 N. J. L. 172 (i8gi); Victor Safe & Lock Co. v. Texas State Trust
Co., 99 S. W. Rep. io49 (Tex. i9o).
If the facts are such as to charge the subsequent purchaser with knowledge of the defect in the title of the original vendee, his vendor, good title
will not pass to him. Johnson-Brinkman Commission Co. v. Central Bank, 1x6
Mo. 558 (1893) ; Garbutt v. Bank, 22 Wis. 384 (1867). Attaching or judgment
creditors who levy on personal property are not bona fide purchasers and the
rights of the original vendor may be asserted against such. Bergan v. Magnus,
98 Ga. 514 (1896); Stone v. Perry, 6o Me. 48 (1873).
ToaTs-Rm.xASE--J01NT ToarsoRs-The only instrument which will bar
action against an alleged joint tortfeasor is a release for satisfaction given of a
joint tortfeasor. McClure v. Penna. R. R. Co., s3 Pa. Sup. Ct. 638 (1913).
A covenant not to sue one of several joint tortfeasors does not relieve the
others from liability. Smith v. Dixie Park Co., 157'S. W. 90o (Tenn. 1913);
Walsh v. Hanan, 93 App. Div. 58o (N. Y. xo4)- It does not release the covenantee himself, but gives him an action in breach of contract if he is sued.
Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Averill, 224 Il1.516 (iqo6). It has been held in one
case that the consideration given for a covenant not to sue does not apply in
mitigation of damages against other tortfeasors. Musolf v. Duluth Electric
Co., 122 N. W. Rep. 776 (Minn. igog). A release not under seal is often given
the effect of a covenant not to sue and does not affect those not included in its
terms except in mitigation of damages. Edens v. Fletcher, 98 Pac. 784 (Kan.
igo8); Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N. Y. 455 (1903).
To plead release, it must be shown that a joint tortfeasor was released.
Satisfaction by a stranger is no defense. Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Chapman, 145
Fed. 886 (i9o6) ; Thomas v. C. R. P. of N. J., 194 Pa. 511 (r9oo) ; Hirschfield
v. Alsberg, 47 Misc. 141 (N. Y. i9o5). But other courts have held that anything given because of the claim is satisfaction.therefor, and a release of anyone from liability for a consideration is a release pro tanto of all persons liable.
Snyder v. Mutual Telegraph Co., 112 N. W. Rep. 776 (Ia. x9o7) ; Hartigan v.
Dickson, 81 Minn. 284 (igoo).
To release joint tortfeasors, the release must be for satisfaction received
by the claimant, because, although the claimant is entitled to but one satisfaction. he is entitled to that and may sue until he has recovered satisfaction. Sloan
v. Herrick. 49 Vt. 328 (1874). If the release is under seal, the seal implies satisfaction and releases all joint tortfeasors despite any stipulation to the contrary in the deed. Smith v. Consolidated Gas Co., 36 Misc. 131 (N. Y. igor);
Seither v. Phila. Traction Co.. 125 Pa. 397 (1889) ; Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md. 6o
(1876). So also does a release not under seal if complete satisfaction is given.
Seither v. Phila. Traction Co., supra. Part satisfaction for release not under
seal acts as a release pro tanto of the joint tortfeasors. Home Telephone Co.
v. Fields, xo Ala. 306 (i9o7); Arnett v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 64 Mo. App. 368
(i8g5). A dictum in Schramm v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 35 App. Div. 334
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(N. Y. i898) indicates that any sum received in satisfaction of an unliquidated claim from one joint tortfeasor releases the rest.
UNITED STATES-SIuTS AGAINsT-JrRisnlcrio-The National Home for
Disabled Soldiers was summoned as trustee in an action before a Maine
court. The Home was established under an act of Congress and jurisdiction
over its lands was ceded to the United States by an act of the State Legislature. Held: The essential character and functions of the Home are those
of an agency-an instrumentality of the United States Government-and
the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over it. Brooks Hardware Co.
v. Greer ai al., 87 Atl. Rep. 889 (Me. 1913).
Congress has power to exercise exclusive legislation over all places purchased by consent of the state in which they are for the erection of forts,
magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings. U. S. Const,
Art. 1, §8. Accordingly, where the United States has purchased lands from
any state with its consent for such purposes, the jurisdiction of the United
States is exclusive. United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 6o (U. S. 18ig);
State v. Clary. 8 Mass. 72 (18j) ; State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359 (1897) ; Allegheny Co. v. McClung, 53 Pa. 482 (1867).
The cession of exclusive jurisdiction may be accompanied, however, with
any conditions not inconsistent with the effective use of the property for the
public purposes intended. Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525
(1885). And where the purchase is made without consent of the state, it
may impose the condition that such jurisdiction shall be retained by the
United States only so long as the place is used for those purposes.. Palmer
v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399 (i&,6). It is customary for the ceding states to
reserve the right to serve civil and criminal processes upon the lands. Brooks
Hardware Co. v. Greer ct al., supra; United States v. Davis, 5 Mason, 356
(JU. S. 1829). This condition is made to prevent such places from becoming sanctuaries for debtors and criminals, and is not considered as interfering in any way with the supremacy of the United States over them.
State Legislatures may not by subsequent acts impose additional restrictions
on the jurisdiction ceded. In re Ladd, 74 Fed. Rep. 31 (U. S. 1896).
The rights and remedies of the United States in respect to land owned
by it within any state and over which it has no cession of jurisdiction are
governed by the lex rei sitae unless treaties or statutes otherwise provide.
United States v. Ames, i Woodb. & M. 76 (U. S. 1845).
WILLs-REPULICATION BY PAitoL-The contestant of a will admitted to

probate appealed from the decision of the Register, alleging that an earlier
will had been republished by the testator after the execution of the one protested. Held: The appeal is dismissed, the evidence of parol republication being so uncertain and the testimony so conflicting that it could not
be accepted as establishing a republication, were such thing possible by parol.
Holmes' Estate, 24j Pa. 537 (913).
. When at common law devises of land by will first came to be permitted,
it seems there could be a republication of a will by parol, since neither witnesses nor the signature of the testator to the original instrument were
required. Anon., 2 Show. 48 (abt. I68o); Cotton v. Cotton, cited in 2
Vern. 2og. In England republication by parol is prevented by the sixth
section of the Act of 29 Car. II., c. 3. In America most courts hold a
parol republication good if made In a way equivalent to the original execution of the will. In re Simpson, 56 How. Prac. 125 (N. Y. 1878); Havard
v. Davis, 2 Biun. 4o6 (Pa. 18;o); Love v. Johnston, 34 N. C. 355 (851) ;
Barker v. Bell, 46 Ala. 216 (1871) ; Maxwell v. Maxwell, 6o Ky. (3 Metc.),
(ox
x86o).
In Pennsylvania, under the Act of 1705, 1 Sin. Laws, 35, pl. 6, a will
might be republished by a parol declaration because neither signature, seal,
nor attestation cf witnesses was necessary to its execution. Havard v. Davis,
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supra. But it would scem that such republication must be with the same
solemnities as were requisite to the execution of the original. Jones v.
Hartley, 2 Whar. io3 (Pa. 1837) ; Campbell v. Jamison, 8 Pa. 498 (1848).
Since the Act of 1833. P. L 249, it would seem that republication by parol
is not possible, at least where it would operate as a revocation of a subsequent will. Rankin v. Rankin, 5 W. N. C. 127 -(1877); Rankin's Estate,
4 W. N. C. 203 (1877). But where there was but one will and a revocation pro tanto of the same by the subsequent birth of a child a parol republication to two witnesses was held good. Gillespie's Estate, 5 D. R. 65, 43
Pitts. L J. 222 (Pa. 1895).

